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Abstract. We investigate the protection ofmigrating agents against the
untrusted sites they traverse. The resulting calculus provides a formal
framework to reason about protection policies and security protocols
over distributed, mobile infrastructures, and aims to stand to ambients
as the spi calculus stands to π. We present a type system that separates
trusted and untrusted data and code, while allowing safe interactions
with untrusted sites. We prove that the type system enforces a privacy
property, and show the expressiveness ofthe calculus via examples and
an encoding ofthe spi calculus.
Introduction
Secure communication in the π-calculus relies on private channels. Process
(νn)( n m |n(x).P ) uses a private channel n to transmit message m. In-
tuitively, this guarantees the secrecy of m since no third process mayinterfere
with n. In a distributed network, however, the subprocesses n m  and n(x).P
maybe located at remote sites, and the link between them be phy sicallyinse-
cure regardless of the privacyof n. It maytherefore be desirable to implement a
channel meant to deliver private information with lower level mechanisms, as for
instance the encrypted connection over a public channel of the spi calculus [3]:
(νn)( p {m}n |p(y).case y of {x}n in P ) (1)
The knowledge of n is still conﬁned here, but its role is diﬀerent: n is an encryp-
tion key, rather than a channel. The message is encrypted and communicated
along a public channel p; even though the encrypted packet is intercepted, only
the intended receivers, which possess the key n, maydecry pt it to obtain m
(cf. [1] for a thorough discussion of the shortcomings of the scheme.)
Similar mechanisms for secrecyare available for Mobile Ambients, MA, [10].
The following process, for instance, provides for the exchange of messages be-
tween locations a and b.
(νn)(a[ [ n[ [out a.in b. m ] ]] ] | b[ [open n.(x).P ] ]) (2)
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Ideally, no adversary can discover or seizem, or cause a diﬀerent message to be
delivered at b,a sm is encapsulated into the secret ambient n.
The question we address in this paper is whether the abstract enveloping
mechanism above can be turned into a realistic model of securityfor calculi of
mobile agents that need to enforce protection policies and secrecyguarantees
in untrusted environments. The answer we provide is articulated, and leads us
to introduce new ﬂexible, lower-level mechanisms. Our work is inspired bythe
development of spi from π in the ambition of identifying suitable such primitives.
Structure of the paper. §1 discusses how to achieve secrecyin (variants of)
MA, and presents the motivations for introducing speciﬁc primitives; §2 provides
a formal deﬁnition of the outcome, the SBA calculus, and illustrates it with a
few examples. A keypoint of our work is the development in §3 of a type system
which governs the interactions between trusted and untrusted (opponents) com-
ponents travelling over open networks. Types split the world in two: the trusted
system and the untrusted context. Relying on such intuition, data coming from
the external environment is assigned an “unknown” type Public; Public values
are handled with suspicion, since there is no saying what they are, or whom
they are from. The type system guarantees a secrecy propertyproved in §4: a
well-typed process does not disclose its secrets to any adversary, even though
these mayknow its public names and traverse its sub-ambients. §5 presents an
encoding of the spi calculus in SBA as a starting point for future comparisons
between the two calculi.
1 A Sealing Mechanism for Ambients
The literature on mobile agent securityfocuses mainlyon the dual problems
of protecting a host from incoming agents and protecting a mobile agent from
malicious hosts. Cry ptographyis used eﬀectivelyin the latter case, bysetting
up a network of trusted sites and mechanisms of authentication between such
sites and encrypted agents on the move (cf. [20,18]). The sealing mechanism we
envision aims at protecting the secrecyof data inside ambient-like mobile agents
which move freelyin a network of possiblyunreliable sites. The ﬁrst question is
whether these mechanisms are needed at all.
The securitymodel of the Ambient Calculus [8] is centred around the idea
that names provide the keyto access the contents (data and code) encapsulated
byambients. Accordingly , as long an ambient name is secret, its content is pro-
tected from undesired access. The protocol for message exchange in (2), which
here we question, is based on such secrecyassumption.
We start from the observation that ambient movement cannot occur with-
out ambient revealing their names to some (not necessarilytrusted) component
of the underlying infrastructure. This happens in current implementations (cf.
the ambient managers of [13] and the pointers-to-parent of [19]), and it is hard
to conceive how it could possiblybe otherwise. In the internetworking of the
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running complex protocols. Travelling active packets will have to negotiate sev-
eral conditions, such as QoS guarantees and bandwidth occupation, as well as
paying for the service received. The principles of interoperability across diﬀerent
networks and of data encapsulation will require such protocols to work as direct
dialogues between the interested parties. This can onlyrelyon direct communi-
cation and, therefore, force agents to reveal their interfaces to the network. Thus,
quite as secure remote communication cannot relyexclusivelyon private names,
the securityof a mobile ambient cannot be relegated to the conﬁdentialityof its
name. Back to our example, the encapsulation mechanism of (2) turns out not
to be secure, as in a realistic scenario name n will have to be disclosed.
We maythink of two way s to provide for stronger securityguarantees.
One possibilityis to commit to agents their own security , byresorting to co-
capabilities. For instance, process (1) can be recast in Safe Ambients, SA, [16]
as shown below.
(νn)(a[ [n[ [out a.in b.open n. m ] ] | out a] ] | b[ [in b.open n.(x)P ] ]) (3)
An alternative approach is to protect the secrecyof an ambient name bywrap-
ping the ambient in a box that carries it to destination:
(νn)(a[ [p[ [out a.in b | n[ [ m ] ]] ]] ] | b[ [open p.open n.(x)P ] ]) (4)
The ﬁrst protocol guarantees that no one can enter n, or open it and read
m before n reaches b, even though the name n is revealed while n is on the
move. Notice that we ignore here the orthogonal issue of authenticating b against
possible malicious impersonators. In (4), name n and message m are protected
bythe wrapper ambient p, to be opened at the target site b.N o wn need not
reveal its name – even though p is forciblyopened byan attacker – because it
does not move.
Whether or not these protocols are satisfactorydepends on the kind of agents
and networks targeted. If we look at ambients as abstract physical devices, such
as laptops or PDA’s, then the ﬁrst approach is likelyto be all we need: phy sical
devices can easilyperform access control to protect their contents in way s similar
to those encompassed byco-capabilities in (3). If instead, we think of ambients
as representing “soft” agents, then (3) is onlyappropriate in “friendly ” networks,
where gateway s respect the privacyof the code theyroute to the next hop to
destination.
The second approach is more robust and applies well to the case of soft agents.
In particular, in (4), we maythink of n[ [ m ] ] as a piece of data encrypted under
the key n: this is consistent with the structure of the protocol, as ambient n need
not be active while inside p, since it is the thread out a.in b that routes p (hence
n) to destination. On the other hand, this solution cannot be fruitfullyapplied
to protect active agents, which cannot move autonomouslywhen encry pted.
The solution we advocate combines the beneﬁts of the two approaches just dis-
cussed, byintroducing new abstract primitives (which can be read as) providing972 M. Bugliesi et al.
for subjective access control by ways of co-capabilities, and data encryption to
preserve secrecyof data while allowing agents to move autonomously .
We develop our approach for the calculus NBA of [7], a calculus of (boxed)
ambients based on two ideas: direct, named communication across parent-child
boundaries, and dynamic learning of incoming ambients’ names. An NBA am-
bient owns two channels, one for local, intra-ambient interactions, and one
for hierarchical ‘upward’ communications. For instance (x)n.P | n[ [ m ↑.Q] ]
reduces to P{x := m}|n[ [Q] ], and symmetrically with the roles of in-
put and output swapped. Moreover, co-capabilities are binders, so that
a[ [ in b,k .P ] ] | b[ [ in(x,k).Q ] ] reduces to b[ [ a[ [P ] ] | Q{x := a} ] ], and simi-
larlyfor the out capability. This means that Q inside b has learnt the name of
the incoming agent a. Observe that k acts to control access to b, and must be
matched by a for the move to take place. Actually, name binding and access
control checking work in a wayat all analogous to the exchange of names and
credentials which occur when registering for a networked service (cf. [7] for a
deeper discussion and for related work).
Following the intuitions highlighted above, on top of the communication and
movement mechanisms ` al aNBA, we introduce a speciﬁc primitive to let an am-
bient ‘seal’ itself: n[ [seal k.P | Q] ] −→ n{| P | Q|} k. Byexercising the capability
seal k in one of its internal threads, ambient n blocks all its interactions with the
outside and encrypts all its messages (to be exchanged either locally or across
boundaries), included those in the thread Q. The ﬂexibilityof this mechanism
derives from the fact that a “sealed” ambient n{| P | Q|} k is still (partially) ac-
tive: in particular, it maystill move over the network and perform limited forms
of local synchronisation. On the contrary, its message exchanges are blocked and
all its data encrypted, and so remain until it reaches a computational environ-
ment which knows k, the sealing key. The mechanism to unseal a sealed ambient
is associated to movement and exercised through co-capabilities containing keys
such as in the following process, where n{P  } is an ambient that can be either
sealed or not:
n{| in m.P | Q|} k | m{in {x}k.R | S } −→ m{n[ [P | Q] ] | R{x := n}|S }
The resulting model can, in some respects, be viewed as a symmetric crypto-
system, with encryption associated with the sealing capability that secures the
data inside an ambient, and decryption associated with the dual operation of
unsealing performed at ambient boundaries.
2 Sealed Ambients
The syntax of the SBA calculus below is a proper extension of the syntax of
Boxed Ambients, BA, [5], with movement co-capabilities and new ‘sealing’ prim-
itives.
Expressions M,N ::= k ···q  x···z  in M  out M  in  out  M.M
Locations η ::= M  ↑   
Preﬁxes π ::= M  (x1,...,x k)
η   M1,...,M k 
η  in {x}M  out {x}M  seal M
Processes P ::= 0  π.P  (νn)P  P | P  !P  M[ [P ] ]  M{ |P | }NSecrecy in Untrusted Networks 973
Names (k···q) and variables (x···z) range over two disjoint sets; we use a···d
to denote elements from either set, when the distinction is immaterial. Messages
are formed as usual over names and (sequences of) capabilities. Locations in-
dicate the target of a communication, i.e. a process in a child ambient M,i n
the parent ambient (↑), or a local process ( ). The operators of inactivity, com-
position, restriction and replication are inherited from the π-calculus [17]. The
process forms (x1,...,x k)η.P,  M1,...,M k η.P and M[ [P ] ] denote directed
(synchronous) input/output, as in BA, and ambients, as in MA. In addition, SBA
provides a new construct for the formation of sealed ambients, noted M{| P |} N,
where M is the name and N is the sealing key. Three new preﬁx forms provide
for the operations of unsealing, in {x}k.P, out {x}k.P, and sealing seal k.P.
We follow the usual conventions. Parallel composition has the lowest prece-
dence among the operators, π1.π2.P is read as π1.(π2.P), while   ˜ M η,(˜ x) and
(ν˜ n) stand for  M1,...,M k η,(x1,...,x k)η,( ν n1,...,n k), respectively. We
omit trailing and isolated dead processes, writing π for π.0,   ˜ M  for   ˜ M .0, and
n[ [] ] for n[ [0] ]. The superscript   for local communication, is omitted. The op-
erators (νn)P, in {x}a.P, out {x}a.P, and (˜ x)η.P act as binders for the name n,
and the variables x and ˜ x, respectively. The sets of free names and free variables
of P, fn(P) and fv(P), are deﬁned accordingly. A process is closed if it has no
free variables (though it mayhave free names). In addition, we write M{P }
for M{| P |} N or M[ [P ] ] when the distinction maysafelybe disregarded; notice
that in the following M{P } always refers to the same kind of ambient on both
the sides of a reduction rule.
Reduction. The operational semantics is deﬁned as usual in terms of reduction
and structural congruence. The deﬁnition of structural congruence is standard
(cf. [10]). The basic idea behind the reduction relation is that ambients can be in
two states, either sealed or unsealed. An ambient maybe sealed at its formation,
or become sealed as a result of one of its enclosed threads exercising a capability.
When sealed, an ambient maymove but not exchange anyvalue, either locally
or with the context. An unsealed ambient is fullyoperational and maymove, as
well as communicate. The two states for reductions are formalised bydeﬁning
the reduction relation in terms of two, inter-dependent relations, formalised in
Table 1.
The relation  (referred to as silent reduction) gives the semantics of mo-
bilityand sealing. Rules ( enter) and (exit) allow anyambient, sealed or unsealed,
to traverse anyother ambient, sealed or unsealed: the move requires the target
ambient to cooperate byoﬀering a co-capability . Rules ( K-enter) and (K-exit)
provide an alternative mechanism for mobility, akin to that studied in [7]. As in
loc. cit., the incoming ambient is authenticated bya test on the sealing key k, and
then its name registered bybinding it to the variable x. In addition, the authen-
tication mechanism of SBA has the eﬀect of removing the seal on the incoming
ambient, so as to enable it to interact with the accepting context. Rule (seal)
shows the eﬀect of sealing: the capability seal k instructs a process to seal its
enclosing ambient under a key k. Notice that encryption of individual messages
remains indicated onlyimplicitlybythe {| ...|} around the ambient; besides be-974 M. Bugliesi et al.
ing a convenient notation, this abstracts away from irrelevant implementation
details.
Silent reductions mayoccur within anycontext, except under preﬁxes. On
the contrary, the reductions involving communication – which are exactly as in
previous versions of (N)BA, viz. [11,7] – mayonlyoccur within unsealed ambi-
ents, as formalised bythe relation −→. This reﬂects the fact that semantically
relevant local communications must involve clear-text messages and, therefore,
be avoided in untrusted environments, i.e. when ambients are sealed. Finally,
rule (struct) is standard, while rules (silent) and (ambient) guarantee that the
two reduction relations are linked properly.
Remarks. For ease of presentation, the syntax and operational semantics
are so deﬁned as to guarantee that ambients cannot be sealed more than
once. An alternative choice would be to separate the sealing primitives
from those for mobility. Speciﬁcally, one could introduce an explicit unseal-
ing preﬁx such as unseal{x}k.P, and deﬁne its semantics bythe reduction
unseal{x}k.P | n{| Q|} k −→ P{x := n}|n[ [Q] ]. This, together with rules (enter)
and (exit), would implement an unsealing mechanism similar to ours, albeit not
atomic. However, our proposal appears to model faithfullythe current practice
in distributed and mobile systems, where the protocols for agent authentication
and certiﬁcation take place at domain (i.e. ambient) boundaries rather than after
such boundaries have been crossed.
Examples. The kind of secure communication expected of the exchange of
messages in (2) can now be achieved as in (νn)a[ [ p[ [seal n.out a.in b. m ↑ ] ]] ]
| out | b[ [in {x}n.(y)x.P | Q] ]. The public ambient p seals itself with the private
key n, shared bythe sender and the intended receiver, moves over the network
towards its destination, gets unsealed in the act of entering it, and becomes then
readyto deliver its message. Like in the spi-calculus, it is the sealing keythat is
private, while the name of the ambient maybe left public.
Incidentally, this formulation of the message exchange ﬁxes a minor ﬂaw
in the protocols we discussed in §1 above. Namely, in the conﬁguration
b[ [open n.(x).Q | Q  | n[ [open n. m ] ]] ], as the opening of n and the delivery
of its message are distinct steps, there is no guarantee that m will be received by
the intended process when multiple threads are present inside b. In particular, m
could end up in Q , even when it did not actuallyknow the secret name n. Such
behaviour is however inherent to the communication model of MA, and easily
be avoided with the primitives for hierarchical communication of the present
calculus
As a more realistic example, consider the case of an agent in search of vendors
of a particular item over the network. The agent originates at a user site u, visits
a collection si of network sites and reports the names of those which provide a
speciﬁc item it. To protect the agent moving over the network, we use the SBA
primitives as follows. Let k be a sealing keyshared between user u and sites
si. The user can be represented as the process u[ [(νa)a[ [P | R] ] | Q] ], where
a is an agent with two threads: a router R, which controls movements, and aSecrecy in Untrusted Networks 975
Table 1. Reduction and Silent Reduction
Silent Reduction
Silent Reduction Context S ::= −|(νn)S | P|S | n[ [S] ] | n{ |S| }k
Mobility (I)
(enter) n{in m.P | Q} | m{in .R | S }  m{n{P | Q} | R | S }
(exit) m{n{out m.P | Q} | R} | out .S  n{P | Q} | m{R} | S
Mobility (II)
(K-enter) n{ |in m.P | Q| }k | m{in {x}k.R | S }  m{n[ [P | Q] ] | R{x := n}|S }
(K-exit) m{P | n{ |out m.Q | R| }k } | out {x}k.S  m{P } | n[ [Q | R] ] | S{x := n}
(seal) n[ [seal k.P | Q] ]  n{ |P | Q| }k
Structural Rules
(struct) P ≡ Q,Q  R, R ≡ S ⇒ P  S
(context) P  Q ⇒ S{P}  S{Q}
Reduction
Reduction Context E ::= −|(νn)E | P|E | n[ [E] ]
Communication
(local)( ˜ x)P | ˜ M Q −→ P{˜ x := ˜ M}|Q
(input n)( ˜ x)
nP | n[ [  ˜ M 
↑Q | R] ] −→ P{˜ x := ˜ M}|n[ [Q | R] ]
(output n)   ˜ M 
nP | n[ [(˜ x)
↑Q | R] ] −→ P | n[ [Q{˜ x := ˜ M}|R] ]
Structural Rules
(silent) P  Q ⇒ P −→ Q
(ambient) P −→ Q ⇒ n[ [P ] ]  n[ [Q] ]
(struct) P ≡ Q,Q −→ R, R ≡ S ⇒ P −→ S
(context) P −→ Q ⇒ E{P}− →E{Q}
communicator P, which interacts with the visited sites. We use two locks l and
r to synchronise the two threads within a.
a[ [(νl,r)(synch(l) | ! synch(l).seal k.(synch(r) |  it 
↑.(x,y)
↑([x = it] y |synch(l)))
| synch(r).route(u,s1).synch(r).route(s1,s2).synch(r).route(s2,u)] ].
where [a = b]P  (νc)( c[ [  
a | b[ [()
↑.  
↑ ] ] | ()
b.  
↑ ] ] | ()
c.P),(c/ ∈ fn(P))
and synch(n)  n[ [n{ |out n| }n ] ],synch(n)  out { }n
The ﬁrst thread is a loop that, when activated, seals the agents under the key
k, activates the router, and waits for a to be routed to the destination sites.
Once there, it collects the name of the vendor, if this contains the desired item.
The router thread, in turn, ships a across the network to visit the sites, in this
case s1 and s2. However, before moving outside u or anyof the si, it waits for
the sibling thread to seal the agent using k. The reduction semantics guarantees
that, whenever the ambient a is not inside a site which knows k, all data in a
are sealed, hence kept secret.
To synchronise with each other, the router and the communicator use the
process forms: synch(n) and synch(n). Interestingly, local synchronisation be-976 M. Bugliesi et al.
tween threads is available even though the ambient is sealed, since it does not
relyon exchanges of messages. Finally , each of the visiting sites can be coded as
si[ [in {z}k.(x)z. fi(x),si z | ...] ]. When agent a enters si it gets unsealed, so that
it mayhold exchanges with the site. Here the function fi represents a lookup
performed bythe site searching for item x: the result is x if si has x on sale, or
some diﬀerent value otherwise. Of course, rather than total unsealing, a policy
of selective decryption of sensitive data may be desirable when agents interact
with sites onlypartiallytrusted; this variation of the example can easilybe
implemented in SBA.
3 A Type System
The type system separates trusted and untrusted data and code while allowing
safe interactions with untrusted sites. In particular, a distinct type Un is used to
type processes for which we cannot make any assumption on structure and/or
behaviour. Correspondingly, we assign a ‘default’ typePublic to data that comes
from untyped processes, and we handle such data carefully. The structure of
types is deﬁned by the following productions:
Expression Types W ::= Amb[E] | Key[E] | Public
Exchange Types E,F ::= shh | (W1,...,W k)
Process Types T ::= [E,F] | Un
Untrusted processes are built upon expressions of type Public. In addition, the
type Public is assigned to expressions that trusted processes mayexchange
with untrusted ones. Among such expressions, we include the movement (co-
)capabilities, so as to enhance the ﬂexibilityof ty ping: there is no negative eﬀect
on safety(or security ) in this choice, as the interaction among trusted compo-
nents is enabled bythe possession of shared key s, which are secret and hence
protected from the untrusted components. The type Key[E] is the type of seal-
ing key s: a keywith this ty pe mayonlybe used to seal (trusted) ambients of
type Amb[E]. The latter, in turn, is the type of all the trusted ambients whose
upward exchanges (if any) have type E. Notice that onlyambients (not generic
expressions) can be sealed. However, even untrusted ambients maybe sealed,
but in that case the sealing keyis a generic expression of ty pe Public and no
securityguarantee is made. As for process ty pes, [ E,F] is the type of all pro-
cesses that can be enclosed in ambients of type Amb[F], with E and F denoting
the local and upward exchanges of the processes in question. Un is the type of
the untrusted processes. In order to provide the intended privacyguarantees,
the types of trusted and untrusted data and processes are kept separate (there
is no subsumption rule, nor any common super-type). Nevertheless, the typing
rules for processes allow non-trivial forms of interaction between trusted and un-
trusted processes. Speciﬁcally, ambients have full migration capabilities as the
type system allow trusted ambients to traverse untrusted ones and vice versa (as
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be unsealed onlywithin trusted (resp. untrusted) contexts. As for communica-
tion, the following policyis adopted: ( i) local exchanges are allowed everywhere
except that at top level, where we disallow local exchanges between trusted and
untrusted processes, and (ii) trusted and untrusted ambients mayexchange val-
ues across boundaries, provided that such values have type Public. We proceed
with the description of the typing rules, collected in Tables 2 and 3.
Typing Rules. Every(co-)capabilityis assigned ty pe Public; accordingly, the
rule (Prefix) allows trusted ambients to traverse untrusted ones and vice versa
without breaking the soundness of the type system. Note that ill-formed (paths
of) capabilities, such as a.b and in (a.b) do type check in this system when a,b are
Public. This is necessaryto allow full ﬂexibilityin the ty ping of the opponent:
on the other hand, we will prove that the type system providse the expected
guarantees of secrecyand safetyfor anyvalue exchange.
Each process form has two associated typing rules, depending on whether the
process in question is to be considered trusted (Table 2) or deemed untrusted
(Table 3): in the latter case, it could be an attacker or a trusted process tainted
byan interaction with an untrusted component via its public names. For preﬁxes
the two cases can be accounted for bya single rule, ( Prefix), where T stands
for either [E,F]o rUn. For ambients we need four rules: rule (Amb Seal) in
Table 2, assigns a type to ambients formed with the ‘right’ key N, and enclosing a
process P with the expected exchanges. Rule (Amb) in Table 2 is standard. Rules
(Untrusted Amb/Amb Seal), in Table 3 are used to type untrusted, possibly
ill-formed, ambients. In addition, observe that a trusted (sealed) ambient may
be typed with type Un; this is perfectlycorrect and allows a trusted (sealed)
ambient to traverse untrusted sites.
The same rationale applies to the preﬁx constructors for sealing and unseal-
ing, as well as for local and upward communication. Three typing rules handle
the case of input (output) from a sub-ambient M. As we noted above, we allow
untrusted and trusted process to exchange values, as long as these have type
Public, as required in rules (Untrusted Input/Output M) in Table 3. Note
also that in these rules we do not require that the arityof the downward com-
munication matches that of the target ambient. This leaves full ﬂexibilityin the
typing of opponent processes, as it is implied by the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Typability). Let P be a process with fn(P)={a1,...,a n}
and fv(P)={x1,...,x m}. Then a1 : Public,...,a n : Public,x 1 :
Public,...,x m : Public   P : Un,
In other words, no constraint is imposed on the structure of the opponent: only
that it initiallydoes not know anysecret. In addition, one can easilyprove the
standard propertyof ty pe preservation under reduction.
Proposition 2 (Subject Reduction). If Γ   P : T and P −→ Q, then
Γ   Q : T.978 M. Bugliesi et al.
Table 2. Typing Rules: Trusted Processes
(empty)
∅  
(Env x)
Γ    x/ ∈ Dom(Γ)
Γ,x : W   
(Projection)
Γ    Γ(M)=W
Γ   M : W
(Path)
Γ   M1 : Public Γ   M2 : Public
Γ   M1.M2 : Public
(Co-in)
Γ   
Γ   in : Public
(Co-out)
Γ   
Γ   out : Public
(In M)
Γ   M : WW ∈{ Amb[E],Public}
Γ   in M : Public
(Out M)
Γ   M : WW ∈{ Amb[E],Public}
Γ   out M : Public
(Prefix)
Γ   M : Public Γ   P : T
Γ   M.P : T
(Seal)
Γ   M : Key[E] Γ   P :[ F,E]
Γ   seal M.P :[ F,E]
(Amb )
Γ   M : Amb[E] Γ   P :[ F,E]
Γ   M[ [P ] ] : T
(Amb Seal)
Γ   N : Key[E] Γ   M : Amb[E] Γ   P :[ F,E]
Γ   M{ |P | }N : T
(Co-In Key)
Γ   M : Key[E] Γ,x:Amb[E]   P :[ G,H]
Γ   in {x}M.P :[ G,H]
(Co-Out Key)
Γ   M : Key[E] Γ,x:Amb[E]   P :[ G,H]
Γ   out {x}M.P :[ G,H]
(Dead)
Γ   
Γ   0 : T
(Par)
Γ   P : TΓ   Q : T
Γ   P | Q : T
(New)
Γ,n : W   P : T
Γ   (νn)P : T
(Repl)
Γ   P : T
Γ  !P : T
(Local Input)
Γ,x1 : W1,...,x k : Wk   P :[ ( W1,...,W k),E]
Γ   (x1,...,x k).P :[ ( W1,...,W k),E]
(Local Output) i =1 ,...,k
Γ   Mi : Wi Γ   P :[˜ W,E]
Γ   ˜ M .P :[˜ W,E]
(Input ↑)
Γ,x1 : W1,...,x k : Wk   P :[ E,(W1,...,W k)]
Γ   (x1,...,x k)
↑.P :[ E,(W1,...,W k)]
(Output ↑) i =1 ,...,k
Γ   Mi : Wi Γ   P :[ E,(W1,...,W k)]
Γ    M1,...,M k 
↑.P :[ E,(W1,...,W k)]
(Input M)
Γ   M : Amb[ ˜ W] Γ, ˜ x : ˜ W   P :[ E,F]
Γ   (˜ x)
M.P :[ E,F]
(Output M Amb)
Γ   N : Amb[ ˜ W] Γ   ˜ M : ˜ WΓ   P :[ E,F]
Γ   ˜ M 
N.P :[ E,F]
4A Secrecy Theorem
We refer to a standard notion of secrecyin the literature of securityprotocols,
namely: a process preserves the secrecy of a piece of data M if it does not publish
M, or anythingthat would permit the computation of M. The formal deﬁnition
is inspired by[2]. We adapt that deﬁnition to our framework byrepresenting
an attacker as a closed, but otherwise arbitrary, context. This leaves full power
to an attacker, which can either take the role of an hostile context (or host)
enclosing a trusted process, as in a[ [Q | (−)] ], or the role of a malicious agent
mounting an attack to a remote host, as in a[ [in p.in q.Q | Q  ] ] | (−). In addition,
we characterise the initial knowledge of the attacker in terms of the names, the
keys and the capabilities initially known to it. Interestingly, the knowledge ofSecrecy in Untrusted Networks 979
Table 3. Typing Rules: Untrusted Processes
(Untrusted Amb)
Γ   M : Public Γ   P : Un
Γ   M[ [P ] ] : T
(Untrusted Amb Seal)
Γ   N : Public Γ   M : Public Γ   P : Un
Γ   M{ |P | }N : T
(Untrusted Seal)
Γ   M : Public Γ   P : Un
Γ   seal M.P : Un
(Untrusted Cap)
Γ   M : Public Γ   P : Un
Γ   M.P : Un
(Untrusted Co-In)
Γ   M : Public Γ,x:Public   P : Un
Γ   in {x}M.P : Un
(Untrusted Co-Out)
Γ   M : Public Γ,x:Public   P : Un
Γ   out {x}M.P : Un
(Untrusted Local Input)
Γ,x1 : Public,...x k : Public   P : Un
Γ   (x1,...,x k).P : Un
(Untrusted Local Output)
Γ   Mi : Public i =1 ,...,k Γ   P : Un
Γ    M1,...,M k .P : Un
(Untrusted Input ↑)
Γ,x1 : Public,...x k : Public   P : Un
Γ   (x1,...,x k)
↑.P : Un
(Untrusted Output ↑)
Γ   Mi : Public i =1 ,...,k Γ   P : Un
Γ    M1,...,M k 
↑.P : Un
(Input M Untrusted)
Γ   M : Public Γ,x1 : Public,...x k : Public   P : T
Γ   (x1,...,x k)
M.P : T
(Output M Untrusted)
Γ   M : Public Γ   Mi : Public i =1 ,...,k Γ   P : T
Γ    M1,...,M k 
M.P : T
(Untrusted Input M)
Γ   M : Amb[Public1,...,Publicn] Γ,x1 : Public,...x k : Public   P : Un
Γ   (x1,...,x k)
M.P : Un
(Untrusted Output M)
Γ   M : Amb[Public1,...,Publicn] Γ   Mi : Public i =1 ,..,k Γ   P : Un
Γ    M1,...,M k 
M.P : Un
capabilities is important here, since byexercising (a sequence of) capabilities an
adversarymayapproach an agent and interact with it, even without knowing
its name. As an example, if we take the process b[ [in {x}k. a x ] ], an opponent
mayhave access to the value a even without knowing the name b: knowing the
capability‘ in b’ and the key‘ k’ is enough.
We deﬁne a context A(−) to be a process that contains exactlyone variable
(−) (i.e. a hole). We denote with A(P) the process resulting from substituting
the variable with P in A. Also, we denote with fc(P) the set of capabilities formed
over the free names of P: the inductive deﬁnition of this set is straightforward.
Deﬁnition 1 (S-adversary). Let S be a ﬁnite set of names and capabilities.
The closed context A(−) is an S-adversary if fn(A(−)) ∪ fc(A(−)) ⊆ S.980 M. Bugliesi et al.
Next, we deﬁne what it means to preserve a secret: since capabilities are public,
the deﬁnition of secrecyonlyapplies to names. Let = ⇒ be the reﬂexive and
transitive closure of the reduction relation −→.
Deﬁnition 2 (Revealing Names, Preserving their Secrecy). Let P be a
process, n a name free in P, and S a ﬁnite set of names and capabilities. P may
reveal n to S iﬀ there exists an S-adversary A(−), with A(P) closed, and a
name c ∈ S such that A(P) =⇒ C(c[ [ n ↑ | Q] ]), for some context C(−) and
process Q, with c not bound by C(−). Dually, P preserves the secrecyof n from
S iﬀ it does not reveal n to S.
The deﬁnition extends readilyto private names as follows (cf. [9]): ( νn)P may
reveal n to S if and onlyif there is a fresh name m such that P{n := m} may
reveal m to S, with m/ ∈ S ∪ fn(P). Notice that an adversarymaydy namically
acquire new names and new capabilities (i) bycreating its own fresh names,
(ii) byreceiving names over public channels, and ( iii) byunsealing ambients
sealed with a keyit knows (thus learning the ambient’s name). As an example,
take S = {c}, and consider the process P = c[ [ a ↑ ] ] | a[ [ k ↑ ] ]. P does not
preserve the secrecyof k from S, even though S does not include a. In fact,
one can take the S-adversary A(−) =( x)c.(y)x.c[ [ y ↑ ] ] | (−), and note that
A(P) =⇒ c[ [ k ↑ ] ] | c[ [] ] | a[ [] ].
The secrecytheorem below states that a well-ty ped process P does not leak
its secrets to anyadversarythat initiallyknows all the public names in P and
has the capabilityto move in and out anyambient of P (included its secret
ambients).
Theorem 1 (Secrecy). Let P be a process such that Γ   P : Un and Γ   s : W
with W  = Public.L e tS = {a | Γ   a : Public}∪{ in a,out a | a ∈ Dom(Γ)}.
Then P preserves the secrecy of s from S.
Notice that the theorem only holds for well-typed processes of type Un. This
immediatelyrules out processes that exchange non-public data at top level.
Indeed, for such processes no secrecyguarantee can be made, for adversaries
always have free access to the anonymous top level channel of any process. On the
other hand, the theorem captures preciselythe securityguarantees our approach
was intended to provide. That follows byobserving ( i) that well-typed ambient
processes can always be typed with type Un, and (ii) that ambients (i.e. agents)
are indeed the objects of our securityconcerns.
5 Encoding of the Spi Calculus
We further illustrate the calculus with an encoding of spi-calculus [3]. To ease
the presentation, we focus on the following fragment of the asynchronous spi-
calculus, in which we disregard the construct for pairs, natural numbers and
matching.
Expressions M,N ::= n | x |{ M1,...,M n}N
Processes P,Q ::= 0 | M N1,...,N n |M(x1,...,x n)P
| P |Q | (νn)P | case M of {x1,...,x n}N in PSecrecy in Untrusted Networks 981
Table 4. Encoding ofthe spi calculus
The operational semantics of this fragment is standard (cf. [3]):
in particular, decryption is governed by the following reduction:
case {M1,...,M n}k of {x1,...,x n}k in P −→ P{xi := Mi}.
The basic idea of the encoding is to represent an encrypted message with a
sealed ambient that contains that message: communicating the encrypted mes-
sage is then accounted for bycommunicating the name of the corresponding
ambient. The formal deﬁnition is given in Table 4 in terms of three translation
maps:    ·   p : Expressions  → Expressions, [[ ·]] p : Expressions  → Processes, and
[[ ·]] : Processes  → Processes. In the ﬁrst two (subsidiary) maps, p is the name
of the ambient (if any) enclosing the message to be exchanged. In particular, if
M is a name or a variable, then    M    p returns M; if instead M is an encryption
packet, [[ M ]] p returns p, the name of the ambient that stores the packet. Cor-
respondingly, [[ M ]] p stores M into an ambient named p,i fM is an encrypted
message, and returns the inactive process otherwise. More precisely, if M is a
message encrypted under a key k, the ambient generated by [[ M ]] p ﬁrst reads
a name x, then gets sealed with k to move into x, where eventuallygets un-
sealed and delivers its payload. The use of replication on the ambient encoding
an encryption packet accounts for the possible non-linear usage of messages in
spi.
The encoding can be shown to be sound with respect to appropriate choices
of behavioural equivalences in the two calculi, noted ∼ =spi and ∼ =SBA, respec-
tively. In particular, we take ∼ =spi to be testing equivalence, the notion of
equivalence for spi-calculus studied in [3], and for SBA, we deﬁne ∼ =SBA to
be reduction barbed congruence, based on the following exhibition predicate:
P ↓SBA
b  P ≡ (ν˜ n)((˜ x)bP1 | P2). Given these choices, one can prove that the
encoding is equationallysound.
Theorem 2 (Soundness of the encoding). If [[ P ]] ∼ =SBA [[ Q]] then P ∼ =spi
Q.982 M. Bugliesi et al.
6 Conclusions
We have investigated new mechanisms to protect migrating agents against the
untrusted networks theytraverse. Our primitives are best understood as low-
level primitives to be employed for a secure implementation of the abstract
mechanisms for secrecyfound in mainstream ambient calculi.
The resulting calculus, SBA, is derived as a natural extension of NBA, the
variant of Boxed Ambients studied in [7]. In fact, NBA can be interpreted into
SBA bydeﬁning the capability in n,k  as seal k.in n, and similarlyfor out n,k .
(Observe though that this lacks the atomicityof movement and credential ver-
iﬁcation of NBA.) On the other hand, the sealing model of SBA appears to
provide strictlymore ﬂexibilityand expressiveness than the access control of
NBA: a SBA agent can be sealed byanyof its local threads. Hence, an agent
can be sealed and protected from undesired interactions byﬁring an action in
one of its local threads, and it is not clear that a corresponding mechanism can
be recovered in NBA.
We have investigated the role of types in enforcing static guarantees of safety
and secrecyin the presence of unty ped opponents. It is worth remarking that
even though our typing deals with untrusted networks, similar ideas can be used
to generalise those presented in [6] and in [11] for access control and information
ﬂow securitywith untrusted components.
Similar studies have been conducted on other process calculi in the literature.
In fact, our use of the trusted/untrusted rules is directlyinspired bywork on the
π/spi calculus (Cardelli et al. [9], Gordon and Jeﬀrey[14], Abadi and Gordon [3]).
Alternative approaches to the same problem have also been investigated. Among
these, Hennessyand Riely[15] studyan extension of the D π-calculus with a
type system that labels some location as untrusted and relies on run-time type
checking to enforce securityrestrictions for processes coming from untrusted
locations. Similar approaches have also been advocated for Mobile Ambients [4],
and other calculi (notablyKlaim [12]).
Several questions remain to be explored, as for instance whether the data
encryption underlying the sealing mechanisms we have introduced can be im-
plemented eﬀectively, and eﬃciently. Furthermore, in its current formulation,
sealing an ambient has onlythe eﬀect of guaranteeing the secrecyof data. More
powerful mechanisms maybe necessaryto protect migrating agents byfurther
hiding their structure or encrypting subcomponents consisting of data and code.
Plans for future include work in both these directions.
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